Abstract:
Introduction
The idea of Financial Transaction Tax (FTT) has recently gained a renewed support from renowned economists 1 and wide public 2 . Most prominently 11 EU states are in talks to introduce FTT as soon as 2017 (Reuters, 2015) . Besides revenue-raising FTTs are meant to discourage financial transactions that do not enhance efficiency of financial market and as a consequence to curb excess volatility observed in financial markets 3 . Hence FTTs should function as Pigouvian taxes.
The objective of this paper is to extend previous empirical evidence and verify the effects of FTT imposed in securities market, or Securities Transaction Tax (STT) 4 , on market quality measures, most notably volatility, in France and Italy. Especially Italian case has garnered limited attention.
To analyze the effects Difference-in-Differences (DiD) as well as triple DiD are estimated using individual stock panel data. The estimations are performed using several control groups including German and Spanish stocks observing STT's effects on volume, several measures of liquidity and volatility. Current paper adds to the literature by analyzing impacts of STT on liquidity and volatility using several measures of each market quality measure for both France and Italy. Main contribution of this paper is detailed analysis of Italian reform extending the evidence provided by Coelho (2014) .
The results of this paper confirm previous evidence evaluating French and Italian policy changes. It is shown that trading activity significantly decreases in France and suggestive evidence is provided showing an increase in transaction costs measured as relative bid-ask spread. In Italy the results seem to be heavily influenced by general election as I don't detect any significant change in trading activity in most estimations. The effects of STT on volatility were largely inconclusive in both countries supporting previous empirical evidence and undermining major argument in favor of the tax. For both countries the results are strengthened by presenting seasonally adjusted results.
The paper is divided as follows. Following section presents review of theoretical debate on the matter. Third section consists of a review of previous evidence regarding STT effects on market quality. In fourth section estimation approach and data is discussed, while fifth section presents the results of the paper.
1 Stiglitz (1989) , Paul Krugman (2009 ) , Jeffrey Sachs (2010 , Dani Rodrik (2009) 2 For example, in the UK, petition in favor of FTT reached nearly million signatures. According to Eurobarometer survey from 2012 (77.2), 66% of respondents from EU were in favor of FTT. 3 I don't aim to review the literature on excess volatility in this paper. Readers should refer to e.g. Shiller (2003) , who provides some brief evidence on excess volatility. 4 Securities transaction tax (STT) according to the FTT categorization provided by Matheson (2012) . Roll (1989) Cross-country STT up to 20 days no effect --- Hu (1998) Taiwan, Hong Kong, S. Korea, Japan STT 80 weeks no effect no effect no effect negative Baltagi et al. (2006) China STT 1 year positive no effect** negative - France STT 1 year no effect no effect**** negative - Meyer et al. (2013) France STT 4 months -negative negative - Colliard and Hoffmann (2015) France STT 5 months no effect negative negative - Haferkorn and Zimmermann (2013) France STT up to 80 days no effect negative negative/no effect - Coelho (2014) France and Italy STT up to 4 months no effect no effect negative in France/ no effect in Italy negative Rühl and Stein (2014) Italy STT 120 days positive negative no effect -*-for individual stocks and portfolio estimates respectively, **-based on anecdotal evidence, ***-the effect is negative in DiD, but in RD is only statistically significant in the slope implying that STT's effect on volume is more negative for larger cap stocks, ****-depends on control group of Italy by Coelho (2014) and Rühl and Stein (2014) , which are only two papers to my knowledge that study the case of Italian STT. Haferkorn and Zimmermann (2013) find no effect of French STT on volume traded using DAX30 stocks as control group, but they assess the STT effect only on CAC40 constituents, which might drive this result.
Liquidity was also shown to be negatively affected by STT in most cases. Pomeranets and Weaver (2013) find positive relationship between Holden measure and STT rate, while Hau (2006) finds positive relationship between tick size and effective spread 13 . Haferkorn and Zimmermann (2013) find negative impact of French STT on order book volume, but their results also point to relative increase in bid-ask spreads. Meyer et al. (2013) and Colliard and Hoffmann (2015) on the other hand find no effect of French STT introduction on spreads, but confirm negative effect of STT on order book volume. Rühl and Stein (2014) provide evidence of quoted bid-ask spread increase following Italian STT implementation. Liquidity wasn't affected by STT according to evidence from Asia by Hu (1998) , whose methodology, however, could be questioned, and also Baltagi et al. (2006) , who provide only anecdotal evidence. For French STT implementation, Capelle-Blancard and Havrylchyk (2014) show that liquidity (measured as bid-ask spread) wasn't impacted by STT using Dutch control group, but utilization of German control group suggests negative impact of STT on liquidity. Similarly Coelho (2014) finds absent impact of STT on both bid-ask spread and price impact in French and also in Italian case.
Volatility
As can be seen from Table 1 , volatility was found to decrease with STT rate increases only in two cases as other evidence usually suggests either mixed or absent effect of STT on volatility. Jones and Seguin (1997) find evidence supportive of increases in volatility subsequent to STT rate increase, while Baltagi et al. (2006) find the relationship of this direction for Chinese market, Hau (2006) for tick size change in France and Rühl and Stein (2014) for Italian STT evaluated in September 2013 14 . Phylaktis and Aristidou, (2007) test the possibility of asymmetrical impact of STT on volatility in bear and bull market periods and show that in bull market periods STT rate hike increases volatility, while the relationship between the variables in bear market periods depends on the utilized sample. The effect of STT on volatility is also absent in all of the papers assessing French STT reform except for Becchetti et al. (2014) , who find significant decrease in volatility (measured as Parkinson's H-L price range 15 ) following STT introduction.
The evidence of STTs impact on returns is relatively straightforward as seen from Table  1 . Both Saporta and Kan (1997) and Bond et al. (2005) find negative relationship between UK's Stamp Duty rate and stock returns, which was also confirmed for French and Italian STT introduction by Coelho (2014) .
Methodology and data

Overview of implementations France
The STT in France was introduced in Article 5 of Supplementary Budget Act of 2012 16 . The law introduced three taxes 17 : tax on acquisition of equity securities and other related instruments 18 , HFT tax, and tax on purchases of Credit Default Swaps on sovereign debt. This paper assesses the first two measures. The tax on acquisition of securities applies to purchase 19 of equities or similar instruments 20 issued by a company legally registered in France 21 , whose market capitalization is higher than € 1 billion on 1 st December of the year preceding the year of taxation and admitted to trading on foreign or domestic regulated markets 22 . The tax doesn't apply to debt securities, which could potentially exacerbate the existing debt bias discussed by Fatica, Hammelgam and Nicodeme (2012) . Moreover, as Bijlsma and Zwart (2013) show, France has a sizeable corporate bond market, hence it doesn't seem optimal to confine the tax to equity markets only. From revenue perspective exclusion of derivatives 23 from scope of the tax is a much more significant omission as it offers relatively cheap means to evade the tax. The tax of 0,2% is paid on acquisition of the security and applies to net position on given day 24 . The tax design includes important exemptions 25 , most notably on primary transactions and transactions associated with market making in order to minimize the impact of STT on capital costs and on liquidity. Hedging activities associated with market making are also exempted from the tax. Thus we can see that the design tries to limit potentially negative impact of STT on liquidity by taxing only the most liquid stocks, taxing net positions and exempting transactions associated with market making.
The HFT tax is applied when the rate of cancellation or order modification within one day exceeds a given threshold. The tax rate is 0,01% on the amount of cancelled or modified orders that exceed the threshold. The tax is applied only to transactions of companies operating in French market and was simultaneously introduced with the tax on equities, which poses an identification problem. Coelho (2014) simply assumes that the tax affects mutually exclusive groups, because HFTs trade mostly intraday with zero net positions at the end of the day, hence are not affected by the STT. But one still 16 The English version of the document can be found here: http://www.impots.gouv.fr/portal/deploiement/p1/fichedescriptive_7432/fichedescriptive_7432.pdf 17 Note that before implementation of French FTT, France had a registration tax on shares, but this tax wasn't applicable to transfers of publicly traded shares (as long as the transfer wasn't recorded by deed), see Leclerc (2012) . More details on the changes in this tax is and its replacement by current schedule is provided by Leclerc (2012) . 18 Similar instruments include all instruments that could provide capital or voting rights to taxed securities, such as ADRs, even if they were emitted by an entity registered outside of France, but represent taxed securities. 19 Or more precisely as law states: "applies to every acquisition for valuable consideration" (p.3) 20 Similar instruments include all that could provide 21 Thus for example Airbus Group NV is headquartered in Toulouse, France, but legally registered in the Netherlands, hence its equities are not taxed. 22 The list of companies, whose shares are subjected to STT was annually published by French Ministry of Finance. In 2012, the list consisted of 109, in 2013 of 113 and in 2014 of 114 companies. 23 Following the introduction of the tax spike in Contract-for-Difference (CFD) trading was reported by Bloomberg (2013) and Reuters (2013) suggesting relatively intensive STT evasion. 24 Therefore intraday traders with nearly zero net holdings at the end of the day are not affected by the tax. 25 The list of exemptions: 1. Acquisitions on primary market, 2. Acquisitions of clearing houses and central depositories except for transactions that are unrelated to clearing/deposition, 3. Acquisitions in market making activities, 4. Acquisitions resulting from liquidity agreements, 5. Restructuring and intra-group acquisitions, 6. Temporary acquisitions, such as repurchase agreements, 7. Acquisitions by employee savings scheme, 8. Acquisitions of bonds exchangeable or convertible into stock.
cannot infer causal interpretation of the results, because changes in volatility or liquidity may have been caused by change in HFT activity resulting from HFT tax introduction. Meyer et al. (2013) argue that most of the estimated effects may be credited to STT as the HFT tax rate is much lower. Colliard and Hoffmann (2015) devise a simple approach to isolate the effects of the two taxes, which is also used in this paper. Both taxes were introduced on 1.8.2012 while ADRs came under scope of the tax later on 1.12.2012.
Italy
Italian STT 26 came into effect 8 months after the introduction of French STT. The Italian tax design is very similar to French tax, but it offers fewer opportunities for tax evasion. Italy introduced two taxes: tax on transfers of equities and HFT tax. Similarly to France the tax on equities is applicable to transfers of equities and similar instruments issued by companies legally registered in Italy or equivalent instruments issued by other entities regardless of their legal residence. Equities of companies with market capitalization below € 500 million 27 are exempted from the tax 28 . The tax rate in Italy is 0,1% on transactions in regulated markets and multilateral trading facilities (MTF), but 0,2% otherwise -on OTC markets, thus discriminating against OTC markets possibly to prevent further fragmentation of the market. The rate was temporarily higher in 2013 by 0,02 percentage points in both market categories. Similarly to French case, the tax applies to net positions at the end of the day.
The most significant difference between the implementations is the inclusion of derivatives, whose value is primarily tied with taxed securities within the scope of the tax. Hence, the CFD loophole is nonexistent in Italian case making evasion more problematic i.e. more costly. Derivatives transactions are subject to fixed amount of tax, which is determined depending on contract type and its value while transactions on regulated markets and MTFs are subject to lower tax. The exemptions are similar to those in French case 29 .
The HFT tax introduced in Italy also follows French implementation, but the threshold of modified and cancelled orders as well as tax rate differ. The HFT tax and tax on equities has been effective since 1 st March 2013, while derivative transactions came within the scope of the tax in September 2013.
Estimation approach
In order to identify the effect of the tax event on market quality I utilize difference-indifferences approach following previous literature assessing the reforms. The design of the events presents a good opportunity to explore causal effects of the tax on market quality as several control groups can be constructed. Due to common trend assumption 26 To my knowledge official English translation of Italian bill doesn't exist, hence in this section I rely on unofficial translation provided by PriceWaterhouseCoopers (2013) . 27 The threshold market capitalization is calculated as average market capitalization during November of preceding year. Thus the categorization is more precise and less prone to short-term shocks to valuations than in French case. 28 The list of these companies is annually published by Italian Ministry of Finance. The most recent list can be found here: http://www.mef.gov.it/inevidenza/article_0065.html 29 In Italy the tax doesn't apply to transactions associated with market making, which is defined in similar manner as in French case (PriceWaterhouseCoopers, 2013) . Issuance and redemption of shares is also exempted from the tax. Further liquidity enhancement transactions on behalf of issuer, social security institutions and pension schemes, transactions between companies with control ties and transactions for purposes deemed ethical or socially responsible are exempted (PriceWaterhouseCoopers, 2013). under DiD, the quality of control group is crucial for the estimation. The utilized control groups are explored in next section.
As shown by Angrist and Pischke (2008) inclusion of time-invariant control variables into DiD estimation doesn't affect consistency or unbiasedness of the results, but incorporation of these variables increases the precision of the estimates. Hence I include fixed-effects in the model allowing for firm-level variation of intercepts capturing all unobservable (and in this case also observable, but not gathered in dataset) timeinvariant firm characteristics. The propriety of this approach was also tested using Hausman test on French data 30 , which supports fixed-effects as more appropriate than pooling and random effects models. The preference for fixed-effects rather than random effects is also straightforward from the nature of the data used as the fixed effects estimator allows for correlation between explanatory variables and unobserved timeinvariant factors (see Wooldridge, 2002) . It is obvious that dummy for STT treatment will be correlated with time-invariant factors such as ROE and other variables systematically related to company size, thus random-effects is clearly inappropriate even from theoretical standpoint.
Further, in sake of estimate precision, one has to take into account the possibility of market quality measure fluctuations across all stocks due to events such as ECB's policy announcements. The different seasonal, calendar and day-of-the-week effects in volatility and volume were documented by Kiymaz and Berument (2003) among others. To account for potential common shocks in volume, liquidity and volatility I include time dummies in the model similarly to Capelle-Blancard and Havrylchyk (2014) . However, time dummies don't address the issue of differential seasonal and time effects across treatment and control groups, which were also reported by Kiymaz and Berument (2003) . These are addressed in alternative specification using Difference-in-Differencein-Differences (DiDiD) 31 approach following Imbens and Wooldridge (2007) .
The baseline model has the following form: STT represents the dummy variable, which is one for taxed stocks in the period after the tax went into effect or simply the DiD. This is effectively a two-ways fixed effects model as described by Baltagi (2010) . Additionally control variables, , it X , for market capitalization, logMC, and average price, logaprice, are included in the model in alternative specification, which yields similar results and hence is not reported in the paper 32 . This specifications partly follows Meyer et al. (2013) . Capelle-Blancard and Havrylchyk (2014) and Coelho (2014) don't incorporate any control variables in their models 33 . The simple specification without any control variables obviously assumes that 30 More precisely with dependent variable volume expressed in €, and for 60 day estimation window. 31 Also often denoted as Triple DiD. 32 The results are available on request. If the results with controls differ significantly, then they are discussed in results. 33 Pomeranets and Weaver (2013) due to interdependence between market quality measures include average price, average volume and effective bid-ask spread as control variables into their volatility model, because they don't utilize there aren't any time-varying variables causing omitted variable bias. In short-term estimations, current specification seems appropriate, because most of the firm specific factors affecting volatility and liquidity (explored by e.g. Pastor and Veronesi (2003) or Schwert (1990) ) are in most cases fixed, for example ROE or dividend per share in case of volatility, although obviously they are not fixed per se, but cannot be usually observed in shorter time intervals than quarters 34 . In longer horizons, such variables could be industry, management quality or transparency of company.
The unbiasedness of fixed-effects estimator is further ensured by strict exogeneity assumption, which should be met in this case. More concerning is the consistency of the estimator as heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation are expected to be present. Therefore following the discussion in Bertrand et al. (2004) , Hansen (2007) , but mainly Petersen (2009) and Thompson (2011) I use double-clustered standard errors following Thompson's (2011) The effects of STT on market quality measures are estimated in four time windows around the implementation: 30 days, 60 days, 6 months and 12 months.
In order to account for seasonal effects I also estimate triple DiD as in Imbens and Wooldridge (2007) and follow similar approach to that of Coelho (2014) and Colliard and Hoffmann, (2015) . This approach exploits full length of my dataset to eliminate the seasonal effect with the highest precision possible given the obtained data. 36 and zero for control high market capitalization stocks and STT represents the treatment effect, where FRA is dummy, which is one for French (treated) companies. However, the inclusion of full set of dummies may lead to any control group. However, incorporation of these variables to DiD model would be counterproductive and would present a bad control variable. 34 Although one could observe various signals of different reliability from e.g. supply chain and other sources. 35 The zeros in indexes denote zero lag. I employ the HC1 robust errors, which are consistent with Stata's estimation of robust clustered errors as stated by Hausman and Palmer (2012) . 36 Note that this estimation is not applied to small control groups, in such case instead of country dummy I would have a dummy indicating of the stock is over or below the market capitalization threshold. overspecification, therefore I also estimate the reduced form used by Colliard and Hoffmann (2015) . The reduced specification is: 
where only dummy for August and for year 2012 (for French implementation) are incorporated in the model, hence I am comparing the market quality measures in August with all other months in the year and similarly year 2012 with all the other years.
Control groups
As already noted the common trend assumption implies that one would like to compare groups of stocks as homogenous as possible. The tax design offers me a natural control group of French and Italian stocks below € 1 billion and € 500 million respectively. This control group is relatively heterogeneous, hence following Coelho (2014) 
Market quality measures Volatility
The volatility measures in this paper are limited by the daily frequency of the data described in following section. This paper assesses only daily volatility. The first measure of volatility is the "classical" estimator: close-to-close squared return. But this measure is expected to be quite noisy following Andersen and Bollerslev (1998) 39 . Squared return is calculated as: 37 The results are not reported here, but can provided at request. 38 The election in the Netherlands took place on 12.9.2012 positing a possible contamination threat in longer time horizons.
39 Jones and Seguin (1997) and Pomeranets and Weaver (2013) multiply the squared return by a constant,
order to achieve unbiasedness of squared return. However, this transformation is not used in this paper as the bias is assumed to be small and in the same direction in all markets, hence it shouldn't bias DiD estimations.
(5) , it R is logarithmic daily return.
But due to noisiness and the possibility of bias in classical estimator, because of bidask bounce, alternative measures of volatility based on price ranges are also utilized. Alizadeh et al. (2002) argue that efficiency of range based estimators is comparable to efficiency of realized volatility calculated from 3-6 hour data 40 . The high-low price range of Parkinson (1980) provides more efficient 41 estimation of volatility than classical estimator if assumptions hold as shown by Parkinson (1980) , Garman and Klass (1980) or Beckers (1983) . Parkinson's measure utilized here is calculated as:
Ph is the highest price of stock i on day t and
Pl the lowest. The empirical assessment of price range volatility estimators 42 was performed by Shu and Zhang (2006) , who show that most efficient estimator is Garman and Klass estimator while estimator with lowest bias is Yang and Zhang estimator, which isn't used in this paper as described in footnote 53. In general, according to Shu and Zhang (2006) and Alizadeh et al. (2002) , price range measures are robust to market microstructure noise and as Alizadeh et al. (2002) show are less sensitive to bid-ask bounce as the upward bias will be cancelled out with the downward bias of the price range measures documented by Garman and Klass (1980) . Based on this discussion I also use Garman and Klass estimator given by following equation:
, it P are high, low, opening and closing prices of i-th stock on day t.
Liquidity 40 Hence the absence of intraday data shouldn't significantly affect the quality of analysis in this paper. 41 The efficiency of estimators is assessed based on relative efficiency to squared return estimator and following Garman and Klass (1980) is calculated as:
where CVOL is classical estimator and Y is the given volatility measure for which we are trying to estimate efficiency. 42 Following Parkinson (1980) price range estimates were developed by e.g. Garman and Klass (1980) , Ball and Torous (1984) , Rogers and Satchell (1991) and Yang and Zhang (2000) . Yang and Zhang (2000) construct their own price range estimator, which incorporates presence of drift and opening jumps, and is a range-based estimator with the lowest bias, but is not used here as it cannot be used to estimate daily volatility.
Liquidity cannot be described by a single "right" measure as the concept of liquidity is multidimensional in its characteristics 43 . Hence STT's impact on liquidity is assessed using three different measures, which capture different properties of liquidity.
The first utilized measure of liquidity quoted bid-ask spread in relative form. Ideally one would wish to work with effective spreads as they effectively capture the real transaction costs of trading as Bessembinder and Venkataraman (2010) argue, but due to data constraints quoted bid-ask spread is employed. Hereby used measure is based on closing spread, which may be potentially biased due to window dressing by market makers at the close based on evidence by Jang and Lee (1995) . However, the market microstructure on hereby analyzed markets differs significantly from the NYSE in 1990s assessed by Jang and Lee (1995) , thus more relevant evidence on the behavior of bidask spread in today's markets is provided by Wyart et al. (2008) . Despite being unable to calculate effective spreads, quoted spreads at close should represent a good estimate of bid-ask spreads as Hasbrouck (2005) argues that the measures exert correlation of 95% 44 . Fong et al. (2014) assess liquidity measures in global perspective and conclude that relative closing quoted spread is the best proxy for effective spread and other high-frequency spread measures. The formula for closing bid-ask spread following Chung and Zhang (2014) is: Bid correspond to closing ask and bid prices for i-th company at day t.
Besides volume, the effects of STT are also estimated for turnover ratio, which is a volume normalized by outstanding shares of the company. In the short-term, when shares outstanding are fixed, one could expect the effects of STT to be equivalent for both measures. Following Gabrielsen et al. (2011) 
. Data
The data was collected from Thomson Reuters Datastream 46 . Previous papers assessing the two policy changes relied mainly on stocks constituting indices. Similarly to Becchetti et al. (2014) data were collected for all stocks traded at that particular market. In case of France the original sample consists of all stocks constituting the CAC All Shares index 47 , which includes all stocks listed on Euronext Paris provided that Euronext Paris is their primary listing exchange 48 . For Italy constituents lists for All Shares indices couldn't be obtained, hence the data is obtained for all stocks traded on Borsa Italiana. The choice to work with as wide datasets as possible is problematic, because many of the stocks are relatively illiquid 49 . The illiquid stocks were omitted if they weren't traded for at least one day in most of the observed weeks 50 . Obviously this problem is mostly present in low capitalization stocks, which weren't traded. Hence the possible concerns about the propriety of this exclusion (or wide dataset) are addressed by using control groups of large capitalization German and Spanish stocks. Regarding German stocks, the data was obtained for all constituents of CDAX index that trade on Xetra. The obtained dataset also includes companies with lower market capitalization than the taxation threshold, which are used to isolate the effect of HFT tax. The German dataset has one drawback: the value traded was not available for German stocks, hence the data is imputed by multiplying the volume in shares by average price.
Regarding Spanish control group, data was obtained for blue chip, IBEX35, and midcap, IBEX MID CAP, indices, which generally include companies with market capitalization over the Italian taxation threshold, while only few IBEX MID CAP constituents have market capitalization below the taxation threshold. Hence, due to data limitations I didn't obtain data for low capitalization companies in Spain making it impossible to verify the effect of HFT tax. In all cases shares of collective investment 45 Volume was obtained in thousands and wasn't rescaled as it doesn't impact regression results, see Wooldridge (2002) . 46 The quality of Thomson Reuters Datastream data was assessed by Ince and Porter (2004) , who conclude that the data is of high quality after screening. Similarly German equity data from Datastream are evaluated by Brückner (2013 49 This is often also a reason, why these stocks are not included in the indices besides requirements such as market capitalization or free float (the proportion of equity available to public trading) 50 The requirement is relatively mild as for example Colliard and Hoffmann (2015) exclude all stocks that weren'tvehicles were excluded as they were exempt from the tax in both countries. Additionally preference shares were excluded as the paper focuses on effects on common shares.
The obtained sample spans 5 years from the beginning of 2010 till the end of 2014. This allows me to account for seasonal effects in the estimates. The treatment is assigned based on the list of companies published by French Ministry of Finance 51 and Italian Ministry of Finance. Besides omission of illiquid stocks I also excluded stocks of companies, which had initial public offerings (IPOs) and stock splits in the observed period. Stock splits were shown to increase volatility of stock returns (e.g. Sheikh (1989) , Dubofsky (1991) , Koski (1998) ) and mixed effects were also found on volume (Koski, 1998) and other measures of liquidity (Easley et al., 2001 ). Thus, even though the data is adjusted for capital events stocks experiencing splits during the observed period were excluded from the dataset 52 . Stocks of companies with recent IPOs were shown by Schwert (1998 Schwert ( , 1990 to be more volatile initially after IPO 53 with gradual decrease in volatility over time. Similarly stocks of companies, which delisted from various reasons 54 during the observed period were excluded from the dataset. Although, the number of taxed companies has increased since 2012 and anecdotal evidence doesn't point to companies going private or changing the place of their legal registration after the implementation of the tax. Further the data was screened for possible mistakes in capital events possibly present in Datastream data following advice of Ince and Porter (2004) and Brückner (2013) .
The data was obtained for adjusted closing prices, opening and closing price, high and low price at given trading day, ask and bid price quoted at the close of the market, turnover by value, turnover by volume and the number of common shares outstanding. Possible problem is represented by the absence of adjustment for dividends in Datastream data. Umlauf (1993) also works with dividend unadjusted data and argues that the omission is not driving his results. However, it is fairly plausible to assume that following the STT imposition contributions of dividend yield to volatility of stock returns remains unchanged. Moreover, price range volatility measures by Parkinson (1980) and Garman and Klass (1980) utilize non-adjusted prices, thus the analysis shouldn't be significantly affected by the omission.
Descriptive statistics
Several other restrictions had to be made to the dataset as the bid-ask spread was in numerous cases negative. Dataset was restricted to observations with bid-ask spread lower than 50%, which can be considered as a very benevolent restriction, but one has to keep in mind that there are still quite illiquid companies among the small capitalization 52 If stock splits would predominantly take place in pre or post-reform in one of the control groups, then it could potentially drive the results. 53 An obvious reason for this phenomenon may be a novel industry or simply the age of the company. 54 Due to bankruptcies or capital changes such as takeover of Silic SA or squeeze out of APRR SA. stocks. I also restricted Amihud ratio (multiplied by 5 10 ) to maximum value of 10, which is again a relatively liberal restriction 55 . The tables 2 and 3 include summary statistics for the datasets including low and high market capitalization stocks from France, Italy, Germany and high market capitalization stocks for Spain for one year horizon. 55 Becchetti et al. (2014) record a maximum value of roughly 4 for Amihud ratio in their sample. Note that the panels are unbalanced as even for some very liquid companies, such as Total S.A. one can find a missing value 56 in Datastream data. Therefore the baseline model was also estimated on 12 month balanced panel with small stock control groups in both French and Italian case. The estimated models are not reported in the paper, but can be provided at request. The estimated effects from balanced panels are qualitatively similar to the results obtained from unbalanced panels. As the discussed 12 month panels were the most heavily unbalanced, one could assume that the results extend to shorter, more balanced panels. Therefore only results from unbalanced panels will be discussed 57 below.
Interestingly Garman-Klass volatility measure has negative minimum, which is indeed possible as argued by Molnár (2012) and doesn't represent an error in the data. The tables A and B in Appendix clearly indicate the, even surprising, homogeneity of French and German large capitalization stocks with respect to market quality measures. The homogeneity of taxed Italian and comparable Spanish stocks is considerably smaller as seen from tables C and D in Appendix. 56 The data seem to be missing randomly. 57 Note that in short estimation periods the panels were much more balanced and in some cases, as in Italian case with Spanish control group, the panel was balanced in 30 day and 60 day estimation window. 
Results
Volume and Liquidity France Control group: French stocks with capitalization below € 1bn
The estimation results in Table 4 point to decrease in volume traded expressed in both number of shares and monetary units following the STT imposition in treatment group relative to control group. The STT coefficient in 30 day estimation window implies statistically significant decrease of volume traded of approximately 34% 58 . The coefficient decreases as the estimation period increases implying possible presence of temporary effect or seasonal effect. Still, even in one year estimation window, the coefficient suggests a decrease of approximately 27% in volume expressed in shares. However, the STT coefficient in the regression with volume expressed in € as dependent variable decreases faster as the coefficient implies a decrease of approximately 18,7% in treatment group relative to control group after STT introduction in 12 month estimation window. Inclusion of additional control variables also results in relatively significant change in estimated coefficient as it suggests a 24,6% decrease in value traded. The model is not reported here 59 as earlier discussed. The difference in longer estimation horizon across trading volume measures is most certainly caused by the effect of changing price level, which is implicitly included in value traded. Hence the more moderate decrease in value traded had to be caused by relative increase in stock prices in treatment relative to control or by relative decrease in valuation in control group. This explanation is also supported by the sensitivity of STT coefficient to incorporation of control variables for log of average prices or log of market capitalization.
The estimated results translate into elasticity of volume (in shares traded) with respect to transaction costs change of -1,275 for 30 day estimation window and elasticity of -1,0125 for 12 month estimation window if one follows Coelho's (2014) transaction cost estimate of 0,75% 60 . The estimated elasticities are slightly higher than those of Coelho (2014) and Baltagi et al. (2006) , who find elasticities of -0,9 and -1 respectively. However, the estimated elasticities rely on Coelho's (2014) trading cost estimates, which might be too conservative as Munck (2005) Turnover ratio regressions confirm previous results. However, following CapelleBlancard and Havrylchyk (2014), turnover ratio is not log-transformed, which allows direct comparison with estimates of Capelle-Blancard and Havrylchyk (2014), who obtain very similar coefficients. Still in light of latter results presented in this paper it is advisable to use logarithmic transformation of turnover ratio as dependent variable.
The results for bid-ask spread as a dependent variable confirm the narrative provided by volume-based measures. The bid-ask spread is negatively affected in all estimation periods rising in treatment group relative to control group by 0,19 to 0,32 percentage points 62 depending on observation period. 62 Note that corresponding coefficients are 0,0019 and 0,0032, because I don't work with relative spread in percentage form, hence the resulting coefficient has to be multiplied by 100 to get interpretation in percentage points. The results regarding price impact, which is assessed using Amihud ratio, are mixed as seen from Table 4 . Although, all STT coefficients are positive suggesting an increase in price impact and confirming previously presented results of negative effect of STT on liquidity.
Control group: French stocks with capitalization between € 500m and € 1bn
As could be seen from the detailed descriptive statistics in Tables A and B in Appendix, taxed stocks differ significantly from untaxed French stocks, which could be problematic as previous empirical research has shown 63 . In order to mitigate the heterogeneity between the groups, the small cap sample is restricted to companies with market capitalization over € 500 million. Still this control group isn't flawless, as already noted by Coelho (2014) , due to possible spillover effects.
The results, in Table 5 , for volume expressed in number of shares confirm the adverse effect of STT on trading activity, however, the coefficient is of smaller magnitude 63 For example Chordia et al. (2004) document the differences in development of liquidity of large cap and small cap stocks as well as different variability of spreads among the two groups. implying a relative decrease in volume of 15,9% and 13,9% in 30 days and 12 months window respectively. Thus the respective implied elasticities are -0,596 (30 days) and -0,521 (12 months) assuming trading costs of 75 basis points 64 . Interestingly these results don't extend to volume expressed in € as the STT coefficients are statistically insignificant or significant only at 10% level. This is in contrary to the expected direction of possible spillover effects as STT introduction could initiate substitution from taxed assets to non-taxed assets below the threshold. Turnover ratio supports the findings for traded volume in shares as expected.
The results from bid-ask spread regressions suggest a temporary increase in spreads following STT introduction with much smaller magnitude than in previously discussed results. The Amihud ratio points to statistically insignificant change while the models are mostly jointly insignificant as seen from F-tests.
Control group: German stocks
The results are presented in Table 6 . The volume traded expressed in shares decreased in treatment group relative to control group approximately by 24,5% in 30 day horizon, but the estimated effects of STT introduction are significantly lower in longer estimation windows. In 12 month window the STT coefficient is statistically significant only at 10% level and suggests approximately 6,6% decrease in volume traded. Thus the estimated effect of STT on volume fades out much faster than with previous control groups. The implied elasticities of volume with respect to transaction costs are -0,919 for 30 day window and -0,356 in 6 month 65 window assuming costs of 75 basis points 66 . The STT coefficients are markedly similar in regressions with volume expressed in currency units. Models with turnover ratio as dependent variable confirm the results, however, it seems that linear model fits worse than log-linear model utilized with other volume measures supporting the discussion above.
The estimated coefficients in bid-ask spread regressions confirm the findings using the French small cap control group. The coefficients imply an increase in relative bid-ask spreads by 0,07 percentage points (coefficient 0,0007) in treatment group relative to control group after STT went into effect. The coefficients are also relatively stable across estimation periods with the exception of coefficient in 6 month regression, which is statistically insignificant.
Italy Control group: Italian stocks with capitalization below € 500m
As already noted Coelho (2014) finds insignificant changes in volume traded in Italy following the reform, which she ascribes to general election happening nearly simultaneously with reform implementation. As Table 7 shows I confirm these results. The STT coefficients are statistically insignificant across specifications and their direction is mixed. The same holds for turnover ratio. Coelho's (2014) explanation rests on the fact that election spurred trading, consequently compensating the decrease in volume traded caused by STT and claims that probable effect of tax on volume was negative. Such proposition would, however, assume that election results affected trading activity in control group differently, namely that trading activity in control group stocks increased relatively less. However, my control group consists of Italian stocks with smaller market capitalization, which are probable to have less internationally diversified business implying larger sensitivity to domestic political events. On the other hand, treatment group may be overrepresented with financial institutions holding Italian sovereign debt to large extent consequently reflecting into higher sensitivity of these stocks to political events 67 . Another supportive argument for Coelho's (2014) explanation may lie in lower sensitivity of small cap stocks to news events due to their 67 Moreover the election would decide if austerity measures would continue, hence the stronger reaction of financial stocks would be expected. Another possible explanation to distinctively different reaction to STT implementation or its absence in Italy compared to France is different tax design offering fewer opportunities to tax evasion as derivatives came under scope of the tax later in 2013 and ADRs were subject to tax from the initial date of the implementation. Additionally the tax rate is lower on regulated markets in Italian case, which could have routed some volume back onto Milan stock exchange, but I wouldn't expect this effect to be the main driver of the estimated coefficients as trades on MTFs are also subject to lower tax rate. Hence, even in the absence of contamination one would expect a lower impact of Italian STT on volume traded due to different tax design.
The findings from bid-ask spread regressions show relative decrease in bid-ask spreads in treatment group pointing to increase in liquidity. The effects are, however, statistically significant only for two shortest estimation periods as the coefficients for 6 month and 12 month window are nearly zero. The surprising direction of the effect in the shorthorizon may be again driven by the election and violation of common trend assumption. 
Control group: Italian stocks with capitalization between € 250m and € 500m
Similarly to French exercise the effects are also estimated relatively narrow 68 control group using companies with stock market capitalization higher than € 250m, but lower than €500m. The estimated coefficients in Table 8 are qualitatively similar to estimates from previous section. Although in this case both measures of volume imply a statistically significant (at 5% level) decrease in trading activity in one year estimation horizon. The measured decrease is higher for volume expressed in € implying a possible decrease in prices in treatment group relative to control group (or increase in control group prices). The decrease of 21,8% in case of volume expressed in shares reflects into elasticity of volume in shares with respect to transaction costs of -1,3625 assuming that costs are 75 basis points 69 . The elasticity estimates are higher than in case of France, which is opposite to what one would expect as Italian tax design doesn't offer as much opportunities to evade the tax 70 . 68 The estimation results of this control group may be also negatively affected by the relatively small number of control group companies due to relatively narrow market capitalization interval (only € 250m). 69 If one assumes costs of 50 basis points the elasticity is -0,908. Also note that in Italian case the tax on acquisition was 0,12% in 2013 on regulated markets including Borsa Italiana. 70 However, there is a possibility of significant difference between transaction costs on Euronext and Borsa Italiana. The coefficient estimates from bid-ask spread regressions again point to increase in liquidity in 30 and 60 days windows. Models with Amihud ratio provide mixed evidence regarding price impact with the estimates of STT coefficient being mostly statistically insignificant with the exception of 12 month window.
Control group: Spanish stocks
The estimates, in Table 9 , using comparable Spanish stocks as control group confirm previous findings regarding volume as both volume expressed in shares and € significantly decrease following STT introduction only in 12 month horizon. The decrease is relatively pronounced as both coefficients imply approximately 31,5% decrease in volume traded, hence the elasticity amounts to -1,96875 working with transaction costs of 75 basis points 71 .
This result is also supported by statistically significant decrease in turnover ratio. The spread estimates are mixed with only 60 day estimation suggesting a slight decrease in bid-ask spread, but estimates as a whole indicate no change in bid-ask spread. The Amihud ratio is statistically insignificant for all estimation periods. 71 Transaction costs of 50 basis points would yield elasticity of -1,3125. 
Volatility
France
Control group: French stocks with capitalization below € 1bn
From Table 10 can be seen that squared return 72 wasn't relatively impacted in the treatment group following the STT introduction. Still the coefficients are negative, which is in line with estimates using Parkinson's and Garman-Klass price range measures. Both price range measures suggest statistically significant decrease in volatility in treatment in 60 days and 6 month estimation windows. But again the effects may be driven by the control group.
Control group: French stocks with capitalization between € 500m and € 1bn
Estimations using narrower control group in Table 11 suggest that previous results regarding volatility may have been largely driven by the heterogeneity of control groups 72 Potentially one could calculate returns using the middle of the spread, which would mitigate the bias caused by bid-ask bounce, but this paper rather utilizes price range measures, which should also deal with the potentially low efficiency of squared return. represented either by a single individual shock or recurring seasonal effect. All estimations are statistically insignificant with nearly zero coefficients of mixed direction.
Control group: German stocks
Estimations from squared return regressions using German stocks as control group in Table 12 indicate relative decrease in volatility following STT reform. However, this is not supported by the results using price range measures. The coefficients are also negative, but statistically insignificant. Minding the tax design one could expect the price range measures to be relatively unaffected by the tax as activities of intraday traders shouldn't be affected by the tax 73 . These results will be explored in more detail in triple DiD analysis in order to capture possible recurring seasonal effect in volatility. One has to keep in mind the possibility of slightly different market microstructure driving the results. 73 Since intraday traders are assumed to have zero net positions at the end of the day, hence don't pay any tax. 
Italy Control group: Italian stocks with capitalization below € 500m
The results for volatility in Italian case in Table 13 imply that volatility wasn't significantly affected by STT introduction in the shortest observation period. Squared return was significantly affected by the tax only in one year estimation window, while price range measures point to statistically significant increases of volatility in 60 day, 6 month and 12 month estimation windows. All except one coefficient suggest an increase in stock return volatility in taxed stocks relative to untaxed stocks following the reform. The magnitude of STT coefficient is the highest in 12 month period similarly to volume pointing to possibility that an individual shock to either treatment or control group is driving the results. Decreasing the heterogeneity of control group yields qualitatively different results as previous estimation, which is evident from Table 14 . The STT coefficients across volatility measures and estimation periods are statistically insignificant. Additionally the coefficients in most cases switch signs from previously found positive to negative. Thus it seems that results obtained using control group of small Italian stocks are driven by different volatility dynamics in treatment and control. However, the possibility of spillover effects affecting results using this control group cannot be excluded.
Control group: Italian stocks with capitalization between € 250m and € 500m
Control group: Spanish stocks
Interestingly the estimates obtained from volatility regressions with comparable Spanish stocks as control group in Table 15 are relatively similar to those using small Italian stocks as control group. The coefficients for all three volatility measures are positive and statistically significant at acceptable levels in 12 month estimation period, while price range measures offer similar results also in 6 month period. These results indicate that spillovers may be present in estimations using control group of Italian stocks with market cap between € 250m and € 500m. To find out if the estimated effects aren't driven by recurring seasonal effects triple DiD is presented in the next section.
Difference-in-Difference-in-Differences
The devised placebo tests, which are not reported here 74 suggest a recurring seasonal effect in French taxed stocks in the direct vicinity of the taxation evet. The effect was found in both volume estimations with German control group in 30 and 60 day estimation periods 75 , while there is no evidence of seasonal effect in case of bid-ask spread. The seasonal effect also extends to volatility. The seasonal effect is also documented by Colliard and Hoffmann (2015) , who argue that the effect is caused by relatively more intensive holidays in France.
In Italian case, the placebo tests suggest a possible recurring effect in bid-ask spread. Note that triple DiD was estimated only using German control group in French case and Spanish control group in Italian case as these are considered as the most appropriate 74 But can provided at request. 75 The placebo estimates using French small cap control group also support the existence of seasonal effect, but the inappropriateness of the control group may be also behind the estimated effects. Colliard and Hoffmann (2015) presented here are only the coefficients for treatment from the full model 76 .
France
The triple DiD results using German stocks as control group in Table 16 confirm the assertions from placebo tests indicating a significant seasonal effect around the implementation in French taxed stocks in volume in 30 and 60 day estimation intervals. The estimated coefficients point to decrease in volume expressed in shares of approximately 9% and volume expressed in € of 11,4% in August 2012. This is a decrease nearly 50% lower than that implied by seasonally unadjusted results. The coefficient reflects into elasticity of volume in shares with respect to trading costs of -0,3375 assuming costs of 75 basis points 77 . The seasonally adjusted STT effects are 76 Whole estimates can be provided at request. 77 And elasticity of -0,255 assuming that two-way trading costs equal to 50 basis points. very similar in magnitude to the "permanent" effect of STT on volume estimated by Hoffmann (2013, 2015) of around 10%.
The STT coefficient in bid-ask spread regression confirms the results from placebo tests and from Colliard and Hoffmann (2015) showing absence of seasonal effects in spreads as the seasonally adjusted coefficient (0,0007) is nearly identical to seasonally unadjusted coefficient (0,0006). The model confirms decrease in liquidity in treatment group relative to control in short horizon. Seasonally adjusted estimates of STT coefficients from Turnover ratio and Amihud regressions are statistically insignificant.
Similarly seasonally adjusted volatility regressions in Table 17 yield statistically insignificant coefficients for STT variable. Coefficients for all three variables have positive sign contradicting the negative sign of seasonally unadjusted coefficients. The estimates are also in line with the evidence from placebo tests of probable seasonal effect in volatility in taxed stocks in August, which is also in line with findings of Colliard and Hoffmann (2015) .
Italy
Seasonally adjusted estimates in Table 18 of both measures of volume yield statistically insignificant results as in previously presented estimates confirming the absence of a recurring seasonal effect. Same conclusions extend to turnover ratio. Despite finding evidence suggesting presence of seasonal effect in bid-ask spreads, seasonally adjusted estimates provide similar results to unadjusted estimates suggesting a decrease in bid-ask spread during March 2013. This puzzling result may be still a result of individual treatment or control specific shock or, in other words, violation of common trend assumption.
The seasonally adjusted estimates for volatility in Table 19 confirm absence of statistically significant effects of STT on volatility in Italian case for all three volatility measures. However, as placebo estimates produced statistically significant effects in both placebo periods, but of different signs one has to question the reliability of these estimates. Overall there doesn't seem to be evidence of decrease in volatility following STT introduction in Italy.
Identification of HFT tax effect
Even after adjusting the results for seasonality one could question if the estimates isolate STT effect as the tax was enacted simultaneously with HFT tax. Following the approach of Colliard and Hoffmann (2015) the effects can be isolated exploiting the fact that French/Italian stocks below the threshold were not taxed, hence one can compare the development of market quality measures in untaxed French/Italian stocks with 78 In Italian case this approach is unfeasible due to absence of sufficient number of Spanish companies with market capitalization below € 500 million in my dataset. Despite this one wouldn't expect the tax to have large effects 78 as Borsa Italiana had already employed restrictions on HFT trading at the request of Consob according to Grant and Sanderson (2012) . The estimated results for French case are presented in Table 20 for liquidity. The estimates for both measures of volume are statistically insignificant across estimation periods. STT coefficients in turnover ratio regressions have surprisingly positive signs, which contradicts the estimates for volume measures. Bid-ask spread regressions produce significant STT estimates in two estimation periods, in 30 day and 6 month period. In both cases coefficient of interest is negative, which could imply that the previously estimated increase in bid-ask spread could be even bigger. However, it would be expected that HFT tax would increase bid-ask spread in treatment. The volatility estimates, seen in Table 21 , are statistically insignificant across measures and estimation periods. Based on these results one could argue that effects of HFT tax are weak at most if not even completely absent. It has to be noted that this approach has possible disadvantages as Zhang's (2010) evidence suggests that HFTs are more active in highly liquid stocks, which are usually stocks with larger market capitalizations, hence also Colliard and Hoffmann (2013) argue that HFT tax may have much more 
Conclusion
The objective of this paper was to verify the impact of recent financial transaction tax implementations in France and Italy and extend previous evidence by conducting more detailed analysis of Italian case. The presented findings confirm previous evidence from France regarding trading activity, which significantly decreased following the STT introduction. The need to account for seasonality is also highlighted as some previous papers neglected these effects possibly overestimating the impact of the tax. The evidence regarding liquidity measured using relative quoted bid-ask spread contradicts most of the previous papers as for example Meyer et al. (2013) find mixed evidence regarding spread change using German stocks as control group. Thus, the estimates of present paper probably highlight the problem already indicated by Capelle-Blancard and Havrylchyk (2014) , who reach similar conclusions to this paper using German stocks as control group, but find no effect of STT on spreads using Dutch stocks. Therefore, one has to be cautious in interpreting these estimates. For Italy this paper confirms previous evidence by Coelho (2014) , who finds no impact of STT on trading activity as probably political events prevent identification of the STT effects in short-term. 12 month estimations imply a relatively large decrease in trading activity following STT introduction. This result could be driven by derivatives being included into scope of the tax in September 2013, as Rühl and Stein (2014) show significant decreases in trading activity following the inclusion. Hence, the muted response of volume to STT introduction in Italian case may be driven not only by political events, but also by temporary evasion using the transitory derivatives loophole.
Previous evidence is also confirmed regarding STT's effects on stock return volatility as, in both French and Italian case, results suggest absence of STT's impact on volatility. Therefore the desirability of securities transaction tax can be questioned as the tax doesn't seem to fulfill its purpose of being corrective, Pigouvian tax, while negatively affecting trading activity and possibly liquidity. However, such strong conclusion assumes that estimated effects have causal interpretation, which can be questioned as one is constrained by available control groups 80 . Additionally more insight should be provided by future literature regarding possible redistributional effects of the tax in order to fully assess its desirability. 
